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Abstract: Understanding of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy 
among legal and political philosophers reflects an idealised account of the US 
constitution and the nature of judicial review. This view is normatively and empirically 
flawed. The US constitution is built on pre-democratic assumptions and its counter-
majoritarian checks and balances are largely regressive, benefiting privileged minorities 
over the underprivileged. By contrast, ‘actually existing democracy’, involving 
competing parties and majority rule,  is constitutional in its process and effects, treating 
all with equal concern and respect, upholding rights and maintaining the rule of law. 
Judicial review undermines these beneficial qualities. 
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Does democracy need a constitution? The increasingly dominant view is that it does. 
Constitutions are said to enshrine and secure the rights central to a democratic society. 
According to this account, a constitution is a written document, superior to ordinary 
legislation and entrenched against legislative change, justiciable and constitutive of the 
legal and political system (Raz, 1998: 153-4). It is the constitution, not participation in 
democratic politics per se, that offers the basis for citizens to be treated in a democratic 
way as deserving of equal concern and respect (Dworkin, 1996: 24, 32-35). The 
electorate and politicians may engage in a democratic process, but they do not always 
embrace democratic values. The defence of these belongs to the constitution and its 
judicial guardians. This view has been neatly summarised by Cherie Booth, speaking as a 
distinguished QC rather than the wife of Tony Blair. As she puts it:   
‘In a human rights world … responsibility for a value-based substantive 
commitment to democracy rests in large part on judges … [J]udges in 
constitutional democracies are set aside as the guardians of individual rights …  
[and] afforded the opportunity and duty to do justice for all citizens by reliance on 
universal standards of decency and humaneness … in a way that teaches citizens 
and government about the ethical responsibilities of being participants in a true 
democracy’ (Booth, 2005). 
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I believe both the concern over democracy and the proposed remedy to be largely 
misconceived. The one overlooks the constitutional role and achievements of democratic 
politics, while the other places an impossible task upon the judiciary. To a large degree, 
the misconceptions about both constitutionalism and democracy underlying this mistaken 
analysis stem from the idealisation of the Constitution of the United States by 
distinguished American legal and political philosophers, especially those who reached 
intellectual maturity during the Warren Court era of the 1960s. Yet, in certain crucial 
respects its design and rationale is pre-democratic and of doubtful legitimacy in a 
democratic age. As I shall show below, once we appreciate the constitutionality of 
actually existing democratic processes then the justification for its constitutional 
restriction by American style judicial review largely falls. 
 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE US CONSTITUTION 
The US Constitution can make a good claim to be the first modern constitution, while its 
longevity has made it a model for many of the ways we think about the role and very 
form of a constitution. However, it is a complex document that contains two not entirely 
compatible conceptions of constitutionalism – the legal and the political - both of which it 
partly conceives in pre-modern terms. 
 Most written constitutions contain two elements, the US constitution included. 
The first element consists of an enumeration of basic rights that are held to constitute the 
fundamental law of the polity and with which no ordinary pieces of legislation or 
executive acts must conflict. The second element – often the greater part – is given over 
to a detailed description of the political and legal system, setting out the electoral rules, 
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enumerating the powers and functions of different levels and agencies of government, 
and so on. The American constitution initially consisted of this second element alone, 
with the Bill of Rights added later as a series of amendments. However, as the quotation 
from Cheri Booth indicates, constitutionalism is increasingly identified with the first 
element - a Bill of Rights - and read as defining the political morality of a democratic 
society that upholds the necessary requirements for all citizens to be treated with equal 
concern and respect. As such, it has become the basis for the contemporary legal 
constitutionalist approach of rights-based judicial review. 
Legal theorists tend to regard the second element of the constitution as ‘nominal’, 
being of little weight unless read through the first (Raz, 1998: 153; Sartori, 1962: 861). 
After all, a dictatorship could have a constitution in the sense of a description of the 
organs of government. True, a school of thought does exist that argues that we should 
read the first, rights element, merely as a guide to understanding the second, system of 
politics element (Ely, 1980). In other words, we should see rights as indicating what a 
political process that treats citizens with equal concern and respect should be like, rather 
than as what a democratic legislative outcome should contain. However, the difficulty 
with this argument is that there will be a tendency to make the perceived fairness of the 
outcome the guide to the fairness of the process that gave rise to it, so that the two 
approaches become indistinguishable. Moreover, it too makes the judiciary rather than 
citizens the guardians of the democratic constitution and so collapses into legal 
constitutionalism.. 
 Instead, I wish to argue that we should see the second element as belonging to an 
older and alternative tradition of political constitutionalism (Bellamy, 1996; 2007: Part 2, 
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Morris-Jones, 1965; Maddox, 1982).  This tradition sees the political system itself, not its 
legal description in a written constitution but its actual functioning, as the true and 
effective constitution. The political constitutionalist tradition took the metaphor of the 
body politic seriously. Just as a healthy human body depended on a good constitution and 
a balanced way of life, so it was claimed a healthy polity required its constituent parts to 
be in balance. The problem was that this view of the constitution also predates modern 
democratic societies. And although slavery to one side, the American constitution is 
premised on the democratic principle of equality, the founders were ignorant of the 
workings of mass democracies and somewhat apprehensive about their emergence. So the 
system they advocated was largely premised on what they feared would be democracy’s 
chief drawbacks, in particular ‘majority tyranny’ and factionalism. However, in so doing 
they overlooked the constitutive importance of majority rule as the embodiment of 
political equality, on the one hand, and the constitutional role of the balance between 
competing parties, on the other. It is these two qualities of the twenty-two or so 
established working democracies that lend them their constitutional quality and form the 
basis of a contemporary political constitutionalism.  
 
 DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Why should we adopt a democratic form of political constitutionalism? The justification 
for such an approach rests on three key claims (Waldron, 1999; Bellamy, 2007). The first 
is that we reasonably disagree about the substantive outcomes that a society committed to 
the democratic ideals of equality of concern and respect should achieve. The second is 
that the democratic process is more legitimate than the judicial process at resolving these 
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disagreements. The third is that it is also an effective mechanism for upholding the key 
constitutional goods of individual rights and the rule of law. I shall explore the first two 
claims in this section and the third in the next. 
 The desire to articulate a coherent and normatively attractive vision of a just and 
well-ordered society is a noble and important endeavour. But though all who engage in 
this activity aspire to convince others of the truth of their own position, none has so far 
come close to succeeding. Rival views by similarly competent theorists continue to 
proliferate, their disagreements both reflecting and occasionally informing the political 
disagreements between ordinary citizens over every conceivable issue from tax policy to 
health care. The fact of disagreement does not indicate that no theories of justice are true. 
Nor does it mean that a democratic society does not involve a commitment to rights and 
equality. It does show, though, that there are limitations to our ability to identify a true 
theory of rights and equality and so to convince others of its truth. John Rawls has 
associated these limitations with the ‘burdens of judgement’ (Rawls, 1993: 55-7). Even 
the best argued case can meet with reasonable dissent due to such factors as the complex 
nature of much factual information and uncertainty over its bearing on any case, 
disagreement about the weighting of values, the vagueness of concepts, the diverse 
backgrounds and experiences of different people, and the variety of normative 
considerations involved in any issue and the difficulty of making an overall assessment of 
their relative weight. Such difficulties are likely to be multiplied several fold when it 
comes to devising policies that will promote our favoured ideal of democratic justice. In 
part, the problem arises from the complexity of cause and effect in social and economic 
life, so that it will be hard to judge what the consequences of any given measure will be. 
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But as well as the difficulty of specifying what policies will bring about given values, 
disagreements about the nature of these values also mean it will be difficult to identify 
those political, social and economic conditions that best realise them. For example, both 
types of difficulty are in evidence when philosophers or citizens debate the degree to 
which markets arrangements are just or the modifications that might be necessary to 
render them so. How far they can or should reflect people’s efforts, entitlements or 
merits, say, are all deeply disputed for reasons that are both normative and empirical. 
If there are reasonable disagreements about justice and its implications, then it 
becomes implausible to regard constitutional courts as basing their decisions on the 
‘correct’ view of what democratic justice demands in particular circumstances. At best, 
their superior position must rest on their providing a more conscientious and better 
informed arbitration of the disagreements and conflicts surrounding rights and equality 
than democratic politics can offer. Courts can obviously make a good claim to offer a fair 
and impartial process for resolving disputes, where all are treated as equals. But, when it 
comes to making decisions about our collective life, as constitutional courts implicitly do 
when they strike down legislative or executive measures or decide test cases, they lack 
the intrinsic fairness and impartiality of the democratic process – that of treating each 
person’s views equally. They restrict access and unduly narrow the range of arguments 
and remedies that may be considered, and are neither accountable nor responsive to 
citizens in ways that ensure their opinions and interests receive equal concern and 
respect. Litigation is a time consuming business, with constitutional courts perforce 
having to be highly selective as to which cases they hear. When they do so, the case is 
presented as a dispute between two litigants and the only persons and arguments with 
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standing have to relate to the points of law that have been raised by those concerned. 
Such legalism is vital in what one might call the ‘normal’ judicial process, being 
intimately linked to the rule of law in the formal sense of rule by known and consistently 
interpreted laws. But it is inappropriate for determining the bearing of fundamental 
political principles on the collective life of the community. In this sort of decision, the 
limits imposed by the legal process risk excluding important considerations in ways that 
may be arbitrary so far as the general issues raised by a case are concerned. Restricted 
access to and standing before the court, means not all potentially relevant concerns have 
an equally fair chance of being presented. Most importantly, it is the judges who decide. 
Yet, they also disagree. They differ over the relevance and interpretation of the law, the 
weight of different moral values, the empirical evidence – indeed, all the factors that 
produce principled disagreement among citizens. Meanwhile, they resolve their disputes 
by the very democratic procedure they claim to supersede – majority vote. We never hear 
about the potential dangers of a tyrannous judicial majority, yet it is far more likely than 
among legislatures or the electorate. Among judges a majority vote is simply a closure 
device among a haphazard assortment of views. It has none of the intrinsic virtues that 
attach to it within a democracy as a fair way of showing equal concern and respect to the 
ideas and interests of every member of the population. Moreover, a single judge’s vote 
can alter a decision dramatically – something that rarely happens in an election or even in 
a legislature.  
Here we come to the nub of what is wrong with constitutional judicial review – its 
arbitrariness. There is no adequate basis to ground the superiority of a given legal 
constitution and its interpreters over the rest of the citizen body. Not only may the 
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process itself be inappropriate for obtaining a full and equitable consideration of the 
rights and interests involved, but also – and most significantly– it does not involve 
citizens as equals. Citizens are to be ‘taught’ their obligations, to employ Ms Booth’s 
revealing term, rather than to define and enter into them on an equal basis.  A key 
advantage of a democratic vote lies in its overcoming this arbitrary arrangement. Under 
majority rule each person counts for one and none for more than one. All citizens are 
treated equally in this respect – including judges and members of the currently incumbent 
government. The reason that the legislature favours certain peoples’ views more than 
others is because more people have voted for a given party’s representatives than for 
those of other parties. Such aggregative accounts of democratic voting are sometimes 
criticised as mechanical or ‘statistical’ (Dworkin, 1996: 364). But whatever the supposed 
failings of democratic decision-making, this very mechanical aspect of democracy has a 
decided advantage in the context of disagreement. It allows those on the losing side to 
hold on to their integrity. They can feel their views have been treated with as much 
respect as those on the winning side, counting equally with theirs in the vote, and that the 
winners are not thereby ‘right’, so that they are ‘wrong’, but merely the current majority. 
That position has been regarded as paradoxical (Wollheim 1969). Yet, any real world, 
and hence fallible, decision procedure involves accepting some distinction between the 
legitimacy of the process and one’s view of the result. After all, courts can and do 
produce results litigants or observers disagree with, but demand their judgments be 
accepted nonetheless because they satisfy norms of due process. The distinctiveness of 
the democratic process lies in its fostering precisely the political morality of mutual 
respect that legal constitutionalists claim they wish to promote. For it involves accepting 
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one’s own view as just one among others - even if one feels passionately about it, 
because others feel just as passionately on the other side. Democratic citizens must step 
back from their own preferred views and acknowledge that equal concern and respect are 
owed to their fellows as bearers of alternative views. It is only if we possess some such 
detachment that we can live on equal terms in circumstances of political disagreement by 
finding workable ways to agree even though we disagree. 
 
THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
Now, a democratic process involving majority rule may be a legitimate constitutive 
process – that is, a fair way for making collective decisions – but it is not necessarily a 
valid constitutional process – one that avoids majority tyranny by upholding individual 
rights and treating all in relevant ways as equal under the law.  Indeed, the constitutional 
design of political institutions has generally assumed it is not and built in counter-
majoritarian checks. Here too, the influence of the American constitution casts its long 
shadow. The classic doctrine of the ‘mixed constitution’ provided the pre-democratic 
form of the political constitution. This idea assumed the division of society into different 
classes with distinct interests: namely, the people, the aristocracy and the monarchy. The 
crux was to achieve a balance between these three groups. The majority in this context 
referred to the largest group – that of the common people. Later theorists, prominent 
among them the authors of the Federalist Papers, then attempted to apply this thinking to 
a formally classless society. However, they continued to fear the propertyless had distinct 
interests from the rest of the population and in a democracy might use their electoral 
muscle to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor. A related worry concerned 
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various self-interested factions who might exploit populist policies to obtain power and 
pursue their own ends. They saw counter-majoritarian measures, which mainly reworked 
the older ways of dispersing power, as necessary to guard against these possibilities.  
The separation of power between different branches of government was an 
adaptation of the ‘mixed constitution’ and the attempt to balance the interests of different 
social groups (Bellamy, 1996). It was supposed to prevent either the majority group in the 
legislature or a populist executive being in a position to enact laws in their own interest. 
Bicameralism offered a further check, with the second chamber supposedly representing 
both longer term interests and, within a federal system, those of different regions. Yet, a 
prime effect of such mechanisms has been to multiply veto points and produce 
imbalances that favour vested interests and privileged positions (McGann, 2004). For 
they favour the status quo and those who benefit from it. As such, they have invariably 
had a regressive impact. For example, in the US it enabled the state and federal courts to 
strike down some 150 pieces of labour legislation between 1885 and 1935 of an 
analogous kind to those passed by western democracies free from such constraints over 
roughly the same period. Change only came when chronic economic depression and war 
allowed a hugely popular President with a large legislative majority to overcome judicial 
and other barriers to social reform.  
Of course, opponents of such social legislation rarely argue on self-interested 
grounds. Rather, they contend they are upholding the property rights necessary for a 
dynamic economic system that it is in the public interest to keep. Hence the need to give 
these rights constitutional protection against myopic majoritarian calls for redistribution. 
However, proponents of social justice mount a similarly principled case that also appeals 
 12 
to arguments for economic efficiency, and seek likewise to constitutionalise social rights. 
Such debates are a prime source of ‘reasonable disagreement’ in contemporary politics – 
indeed, the ideological divide between Left and Right provides the principal political 
cleavage in most democracies. The enduring character of this division arises to a large 
degree from genuine difficulties in specifying what a commitment to liberty and equality 
actually entails in terms either of social arrangements or particular policy 
recommendations. Views on both tend to be subject to a certain amount of guess work 
and constant updating in the light of experience and evolving circumstances. 
Constitutionalising either position simply biases the debate towards the dominant vie   w 
of the time, usually that of the then hegemonic groups, by constraining the opportunities 
for critique and the equal consideration of interests. 
By contrast, we have seen how a prime rationale of democracy lies in its 
enshrining political equality by providing fair procedures whereby such disagreements 
can be resolved.  That this is also a constitutional process arises from the way it embodies 
the old notion of balance in a new and dynamic form, so that affected individuals are 
moved to abide by the classical injunction of ‘hearing the other side’ that lies at the heart 
of procedural accounts of justice (Hampshire 1999: 21). This requirement calls for the 
weighing of the arguments for and against any policy, and the attempt to balance them in 
the decision. It also involves opportunities to contest and improve policies should they 
fail to be implemented correctly, have unanticipated consequences – including failure, or 
cease to be appropriate due to changed circumstances. Finally, it renders rulers 
accountable and responsive to the ruled, preventing them seeing themselves as a class 
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apart with distinct interests of their own. These qualities offer a procedural approach to 
showing individuals equal concern and respect.  
All three senses of balance are present in majority voting in elections between 
competing parties. This mechanism promotes the equal weighing of arguments in order to 
show equal respect, produces balanced decisions that demonstrate equal concern, and 
involves counter-balances that offer possibilities for opposition and review, thereby 
providing incentives for responsive and improved decision-making on the part of 
politicians. I have already remarked how one person, one vote treats people as equals. In 
May’s terms (1952), it is anonymous, neutral and positively responsive as well as 
decisive. However, notorious problems potentially arise with three or more options. As 
Arrow and his followers have shown, in these circumstances any social ordering of 
individual preferences, not least majority rule, is likely to be arbitrary. Yet, though 
logically possible, cycles and the resulting problems of instability, incoherence or 
manipulation turn out to be rare (Mackie, 2003). The range of options considered by both 
the electorate and legislatures is considerably fewer than the multifarious rankings people 
might offer of the total range of policy issues. Instead, they choose between a small 
number of party programmes. Parties and the ideological traditions they represent have 
the effect of socialising voters so that their preferences resemble each other sufficiently 
for cycles to be unusual and eliminable by relatively simple decision rules that help 
voters select the package of policies containing their most favoured options. And though 
voting systems may produce different results, the choice between them need not be 
regarded as arbitrary – all the realistic contenders can make legitimate claims to fairness 
 14 
and possess well known advantages and disadvantages that make them suited to different 
social circumstances.  
It might be objected that these effects result from elites controlling party agendas, 
making them instruments of domination. Yet party programmes have been shown to alter 
over time in ways frequently at variance with the interests of entrenched social and 
economic groups. To a remarkable degree, election campaigns determine policy, with 
party discipline rendering politicians far more like electoral delegates than trustees 
(Klingermann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994). Party competition also plays a key role in 
the production of balanced decisions. To win elections, parties have to bring together 
broad coalitions of opinions and interests within a general programme of government. 
Even under PR systems, where incentives may exist for parties to appeal to fairly narrow 
constituencies, they need to render their programmes compatible with potential coalition 
partners to have a chance of entering government. In each of these cases, majorities are 
built through the search for mutually acceptable compromises that attempt to 
accommodate a number of different views within a single complex position. Such 
compromises are sometimes criticised as unprincipled and incoherent, encouraging ‘pork 
barrel politics’ in which voters get bought off according to their ability to influence the 
outcome rather than the merits of their case. Despite a system of free and equal votes, 
some votes can count for more than others if they bring campaigning resources, are 
‘deciding’ votes, or can ease the implementation of a given policy.  However, different 
political resources tend to be distributed around different sections of the community, 
while their relative importance and who holds them differs according to the policy. 
Democratic societies are also invariably characterised by at least some cross-cutting 
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cleavages that bind different groups together on different issues. Many of these bonds 
relate not to interests in the narrow economic sense, but shared values. After all, the 
purely self-interested voter would not bother going to the polls.  
These features of democratic politics create inducements to practice reciprocity 
and so support solidarity and trust between citizens. Lying mid-way between self-
interested bargaining and ethical universalism, reciprocity involves an attempt to 
accommodate others within some shareable package of policies. This attempt at mutual 
accommodation does not produce a synthesis or a consensus, since it contains many 
elements those involved would reject if taken in isolation. Rather, it responds to the 
different weights voters place on particular policies or dimensions of a problem – either 
allowing trade-offs to emerge, or obliging those involved to adopt a mutual second best 
when too many aspects are in conflict. In circumstances of reasonable disagreement, such 
compromises recognise the rights of others to have their views treated with equal concern 
as well as respect. They legitimately reflect the balance of opinion within society 
(Bellamy, 1999: Chs 4 and 5).   
Naturally, some groups may still feel excluded or dissatisfied, while the balance 
between them can alter as interests and ideals evolve with social change. The counter-
balances of party competition come in here. The presence of permanent opposition and 
regular electoral contests means that governments will need to respond to policy failures 
and alterations in the public mood brought about by new developments. The willingness 
of parties to alter their policies is often seen as evidence of their unprincipled nature and 
the basically self-interested motives of politicians and citizens alike. However, this 
picture of parties cynically changing their spots to court short term popularity is belied by 
 16 
the reality. Leap-frogging is remarkably rare, not least because they and their core 
support retain certain key ideological commitments to which changes in policy have to be 
adapted. Nevertheless, that parties see themselves as holding distinctive rather than 
diametrically opposed views renders competition effective, producing convergence on the 
median voter, which is generally the Condorcet winner (Ordeshook, 1986: 245-57). By 
contrast, the separation of powers removes (in the case of courts) or weakens (in the case 
of elected bodies) such incentives, for the various branches of government can hardly be 
viewed as competing. The ability of courts particularly to isolate themselves from public 
pressure is often seen as an advantage. But it can also lead to blame shifting as 
responsibility gets divided, with each branch seeking to attribute the political and 
financial costs of their decisions to one or more of the others (Brennan and Hamlin, 
1994).  
Of course, the more polarised social divisions are, the harder it will be for such 
mechanisms to work. The danger of majority domination increases in societies deeply 
divided on ethnic, religious or linguistic lines. In these conditions, democratic 
arrangements generally require measures to secure minority influence. Strictly speaking, 
many of these need not be considered as anti-majoritarian. Enhancing proportionality 
simply represents a fairer way of calculating the majority than plurality systems, say, 
while greater regional autonomy for territorially concentrated minorities merely devolves 
decision making over certain policies to a different majority. Where it proves necessary 
to go beyond proportionality by giving minorities a veto or an equal or much inflated role 
in executive power or federal law making, the danger arises that the checks and balances 
arising from party competition get eroded. The elites of the different social segments gain 
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an interest in stressing the particular divisions they reflect over other differences or any 
shared concerns, with debates about the organisation of government undermining 
accountability for its conduct. However, a legal constitution is unlikely to counter such 
tendencies. It will either reproduce them, its legitimacy depending on the degree to which 
the court and constitution reflect the main political divisions, or it will rightly or wrongly 
become identified with the dominant elite who have the greatest interest in preserving 
unity. 
What about ‘discreet and insular minorities’? As Mark Tushnet (1999: 159) 
counsels ‘we have to distinguish between mere losers and minorities who lose because 
they cannot protect themselves in politics.’ Within most democracies, the number of 
minorities incapable of allying with others to secure a degree of political influence is very 
small.  However, there are undeniably certain groups, such as asylum seekers or the 
Roma, who have little or no ability to engage in politics. In such cases, the necessity for 
legal constitutional protection might appear undeniable. Even here, though, three caveats 
are in order. First, such protection will only be necessary if it is assumed that: a) such 
minorities are at risk from widespread prejudice from a majority of the population and 
their elected representatives, and b) the judiciary are free from such prejudices. However, 
most defenders of legal constitutionalism accept it is unlikely to have much effect unless 
the rights it enshrines express a common ideology of the population about the way their 
society should be governed (Raz, 1998: 154). And as Nazi Germany reveals, widespread 
popular prejudices against a minority are likely to be shared by a significant proportion of 
the ruling elite, including the legal establishment and where they are not the judiciary is 
unlikely to be able to withstand sustained popular and governmental pressure.  So judicial 
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review will only afford protection where there is a temporary lapse from commonly 
acknowledged standards. Such cases – which need to be balanced against those where the 
judiciary may similarly fall short – do not offer a basis for a general defence of strong 
judicial review. Yet, it may be difficult to distinguish the exceptional case, where it may 
be legitimate and beneficial for the judiciary to intervene, from the standard cases where 
it is not.  
Second, as I noted, when the judiciary does intervene it does so in limited ways. 
Courts naturally view even constitutional questions from the narrow perspective of 
legality and formal instances of discrimination or unfairness. As a result, their judgments 
risk being either too narrow or too broad. They either capture only clear ultra vires 
instances of executive or administrative discretion, or treat all attempts to distinguish 
between categories of individual as potentially discriminatory. Meanwhile, informal - 
largely structural - exclusions arising from unequal access to various kind of resource can 
rarely be addressed, since these do not fit the traditional legal model of compensatory 
justice. Moreover, structural injustice usually requires redistributive measures that courts 
can only tackle through general regulatory measures. As the example of busing in the 
United States reveals, such instruments can be too crude – failing to consider knock on 
effects for other related forms of public expenditure, on say health or housing. 
Finally, judicial foreclosure can impair or distort political mobilisation, yet is 
rarely successful in its absence. The key ‘liberal’ US Supreme Court decisions of the 
1960s to which most contemporary legal constitutionalists refer, such as Roe v. Wade and 
Brown v. Board of Education, all reflected emerging national majorities. Liberal 
legislation in most states meant that well before Roe some 600,000 lawful abortions were 
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performed a year. The narrow terms in which Roe was decided had the negative effect of 
‘privatising’ abortion rather than treating it as a social issue requiring public funds. It has 
also centred political activity on capturing the court rather than engaging with the 
arguments of others. Likewise, the civil rights movement had far more impact than 
Brown. Ten years after this landmark decision no more than 1.2% of Black children 
attended desegregated schools in the Southern states. Desegregation only truly gained 
momentum following the passage by large majorities in Congress of the Civil Rights Act 
and the Voting Rights Act in 1964 and 1965.   
Do we not need courts, though, to protect individual rights from exceptional 
exercises of executive discretion – most notably to protect national security in states of 
emergency? Once again, the belief that courts offer a calmer setting that is more attentive 
to rights considerations than legislatures proves misplaced. On the one hand, in both the 
US and the UK courts have overwhelmingly upheld such measures (Ewing, 2004), with 
the Supreme Court being substantially more likely to curtail rights and civil liberties 
during such crises than when peace prevails (Epstein et al, 2005). Not withstanding the 
questionable justifiability of such measures as the internment of Japanese Americans 
during the Second World War or the ban on the Communist Party during the Cold War, 
the judges deferred to executive authority. Yet, in many respects it would be hard for 
them to do otherwise - they neither have access to the intelligence nor the responsibility 
for assessing such risks. By and large they have concentrated on the procedural propriety 
of such measures. On the other hand, though, elected legislatures have not been as 
unquestioning as is often assumed. Party loyalty frequently breaks down in such cases 
precisely because representatives acknowledge issues of constitutional principle may be 
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at stake. For example, as with counter-terrorism measures in Northern Ireland, the UK 
parliament imposed a sunset clause on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
and the even more draconian measures introduced by the Terrorism Bill following the 
London bombings of 7 July 2005 led to Tony Blair’s first defeat in the Commons since 
coming to power in 1997. Far from these measures attracting populist support, there is 
every indication that his policy has become an electoral liability. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Not just legal theorists but also political theorists have tended to ignore and even 
denigrate the qualities of ‘actually existing democracy’. Instead, they advocate a 
deliberative view of democracy, governed by similar considerations of public reason to 
those they believe should be adopted by constitutional courts. Moreover, inspired by the 
largely pre-democratic constitutional assumptions of the American founders, they seek to 
achieve this result by a range of anti-democratic checks and balances designed to guard 
against a mythical tyranny of the majority – not least rights-based, constitutional judicial 
review. However, the check this procedure imposes on majoritarian decision making 
risks undermining political equality, distorts the agenda away from the public interest, 
and entrenches the privileges of dominant minorities and the domination of unprivileged 
ones. Consequently, such a legal constitutionalism produces rather than constrains 
arbitrary rule, detracts from the rights protection of weak minorities, and damages the 
rule of law in both the formal and the substantive senses of treating all as equals. By 
contrast, the workings of actually existing democracies promote the constitutional goods 
of rights and the rule of law. Party competition and majority rule on the basis of one 
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person one vote uphold political equality and institutionalise mechanisms of political 
balance and accountability that provide incentives for politicians to attend to the 
judgements and interests of those they govern and to recruit a wide range of minorities 
into any ruling coalition. The moral is plain – American style judicial review damages 
both democracy and constitutionalism. Rather than constraining democracy with written 
constitutions and greater judicial oversight, attention should be made to improving 
democratic processes through such measures as reformed electoral systems and enhanced 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
 
Notes 
1
 As well as being aired at APSA, longer versions of this paper served as the 4
th
  Martin 
Hollis Memorial Lecture and my inaugural lecture as UCL’s first Professor of Political 
Science. I am grateful to the audiences on all three occasions for their helpful comments. 
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